31 ideas
1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
22024 | Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte] |
1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
22017 | Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
21570 | Numbers are just verbal conveniences, which can be analysed away [Russell] |
22018 | Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22064 | Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
22032 | Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
22020 | We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte] |
22060 | The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep] |
22066 | Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte] |
22016 | The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22019 | Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte] |
1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
22061 | Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep] |
1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
22023 | Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
22065 | Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |